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The U.S.-Canada Lumber Agreement:
Past as Prologue
In December 1986 the United States and Canada concluded an agree-
ment under which Canada agreed to apply an export tax to certain soft-
wood lumber products shipped to the United States. This article traces
this agreement's origins, from countervailing duty investigations in 1982-
83, through subsequent developments in the interpretation and application
of the countervailing duty law, to the most recent lumber subsidy case
last year. It then assesses the significance of this agreement from a trade
policy perspective.
I. The 1982-83 Lumber Countervailing Duty Investigations
In October 1982 the United States Coalition for Fair Canadian Lumber
Imports filed a petition under the countervailing duty (CVD) law' alleging
that imports of certain softwood lumber products2 were subsidized by
the Government of Canada and caused or threatened material injury to
an industry in the U.S. The Coalition's main charge was that the Canadian
federal and provincial governments subsidized softwood products by sell-
ing standing timber (stumpage) at prices well below those charged in the
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I. Tariff Act of 1930, § 303 and title VII, subtitle A, as amended, 19 U.S.C. 88 1303,
1671-1671h, 1675-1677g (1982 & Supp. 111 1985). The petition was filed under § 702 of the
Act, 19 U.S.C. § 1671a (1982 & Supp. 111 1985).
2. Softwood lumber, softwood shakes and shingles, and softwood fence.
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United States. The Department of Commerce (Commerce) 3 initiated an
investigation, 4 and the International Trade Commission preliminarily found
that such imports caused or threatened injury to a U.S. industry. 5
Both preliminarily 6 and finally, 7 Commerce found no countervailable
subsidy conferred by the Canadian federal or provincial governments.8
First, Commerce found that the principal subsidies alleged were not coun-
tervailable because they were not provided to a specific industry or group
of industries, as required by section 771(5) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as
amended (the Act).9 Commerce found that stumpage was available to
anyone on equal terms. The use of stumpage was limited not by govern-
mental action, but only by the inherent characteristics of this natural
resource and the production technology.
Commerce declared, however, that such "nominal general availability"
of a program does not necessarily suffice to avoid its being classified as
a targeted subsidy provided to a specific industry or group of industries.
Commerce therefore also reviewed the actual use of stumpage in Canada,
and additionally determined that it was used by diverse industries making
numerous products. 10 On these bases Commerce found that the Canadian
federal and provincial governments' stumpage programs did not benefit
a specific group of industries. 11
Additionally, Commerce found that the Canadian governments' stump-
age programs did not confer a subsidy. First, Commerce determined that
they did not constitute an export subsidy. It noted that the availability of
the benefits was not contingent upon export performance. Moreover, they
did not have the effect of stimulating export sales over domestic sales.
3. The Department of Commerce is the "administering authority" referred to throughout
the CVD law. See Exec. Order No. 12,188, 3 C.F.R. §§ 131, 135 (1983), reprinted in 5 U.S.C.
app. at 1170 (1982).
4. Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada (Lumber), 47 Fed. Reg. 49,878
(Dep't Comm. 1982) (initiation).
5. Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, USITC Pub. 1320, Inv. No. 701TA-
197 (Nov. 1982).
6. 48 Fed. Reg. 10,395 (Dep't Comm. 1983) (prelim. determination).
7. 48 Fed. Reg. 24,159 (Dep't Comm. 1983) (final determination).
8. More precisely, Commerce found total estimated net subsidies of 0.349% ad valorem
for softwood lumber, 0.260% ad valorem for softwood shakes and shingles, and 0.304% ad
valorem for softwood fence. However, these subsidies were considered de minimis.
9. Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, § 771(5), 19 U.S.C. § 1677 (1982 & Supp. I11 1985),
provides in part: "The term 'subsidy' . . . includes, but is not limited to, the following:...
(B) The following domestic subsidies, if provided or required by government action to a
specific enterprise or industry, or group of enterprises or industries .. " (Emphasis added.)
10. In this regard, it noted that under the classification systems of both Canada and the
United States, the lumber and wood products, pulp and paper, and furniture and manufac-
turing industries constitute at least three separate groups of industries. 48 Fed. Reg. at
24,159.
II. Id.
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Second, Commerce determined that these programs did not confer a
domestic subsidy, either. Commerce determined that Canadian stumpage
programs involved the provision of a good (raw timber) and therefore fell
squarely within subsection 771(5)(B)(ii) of the Act's illustrative list of
domestic subsidies. 12 This provision identifies a subsidy as the "provision
of goods . .,. at preferential rates." 13 Commerce interpreted "preferen-
tial" normally to mean "only more favorable to some within the relevant
jurisdiction than to others within that jurisdiction." 14 Commerce expressly
found that "preferential" does not have the same meaning as "inconsis-
tent with commercial considerations," a distinct term used in subsection
771(5)(B)(i) of the Act. 15 Commerce importantly noted, however, that
there may be cases where the number of users of a good or service is so
limited that further examination of the preferentiality test would be
required. 16
Commerce next determined that subsections 771(5)(B)(i)-(iv) are mu-
tually exclusive. Where a particular subsection clearly covers a given
program, the determination whether that program bestows a subsidy is
governed by the standard in that subsection.
Assuming arguendo that subsection (iv) also applied to stumpage pro-
grams, Commerce considered whether those programs "assume" a cost
of production, as petitioner maintained. Petitioner argued that "assump-
tion" should be interpreted broadly to encompass any governmental ac-
tion that reduces or absorbs production costs on terms inconsistent with
commercial considerations. However, Commerce interpreted "assump-
tion" as "refer[ing] only to government action which relieves an enter-
prise or industry of a pre-existing statutory or contractual obligation."17
It adopted a narrow interpretation because a broad reading of subsection
(iv) would embrace all the activities described in the preceding three
subsections, since all the activities described therein reduced or absorbed
costs of production. 18
12. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(B) (1982 & Supp. 111 1985), which lists among the domestic
subsidies the following:
(i) The provision of capital, loans, or loan guarantees on terms inconsistent with com-
mercial considerations.
(ii) The provision of goods or services at preferential rates.
(iii) The grant of funds or forgiveness of debt to cover operating losses sustained by a
specific industry.
(iv) The assumption of any costs or expenses of manufacture, production, or distribution.
13. Id.
14. 48 Fed. Reg. at 24,167.
15. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(B)(i) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
16. 48 Fed. Reg. at 24,167 n.3.
17. Id. at 24,167.
18. Id. at 24,168.
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Moreover, Commerce decided that even if the term "assumption" in
subsection (iv) were interpreted broadly, the available information in the
record of these investigations indicated that Canadian stumpage programs
did not effectively reduce production costs. In making this determination,
Commerce rejected petitioner's argument that Canadian stumpage prices
should be compared with prices for stumpage in the United States. Such
cross-border comparisons were inconsistent with the Department's gen-
eral policy. Moreover, Commerce believed that such comparisons would
be arbitrary and capricious for several reasons. First, Commerce noted
substantial differences between U.S. and Canadian stumpage with regard
to species combination, density, quality, size, age, accessibility, terrain,
and climate. Second, it noted that additional payments were required of
stumpage users by many provinces in Canada, but not in the U.S. Third,
it noted the different practice in the U.S. with respect to stumpage in
U.S. national forests, which was bid upon anywhere from two to five
years in advance of being cut. In these circumstances, the bid price failed
to take into account any subsequent fluctuations in demand for lumber.
Finally, Commerce noted that recently the U.S. Forest Service had re-
stricted the supply of timber in certain national forests because of bud-
getary and environmental restraints. 19
Finally, Commerce concluded that the residual valuation method of
pricing timber-used, for example, in British Columbia, the largest source
of Canadian stumpage-could not be said not to reflect "true market
value," as petitioner maintained. Accordingly, Commerce determined that
the Canadian stumpage programs did not assume a cost of production. 20
In Commerce's view in 1983, then, the Canadian stumpage programs
did not meet either the specificity or subsidy tests of section 771(5)(B) of
the Act. Consequently, they did not confer countervailable subsidies.
II. Other Early "Specificity" and "Preferentiality" Decisions
In 1983 Commerce made a few other significant decisions covering some
of the key points made in the Lumber cases. In Anhydrous and Aqua
Ammonia from Mexico2 1 (Ammonia), Carbon Black from Mexico 22 (Car-
bon Black), and Portland Hydraulic Cement and Cement Clinker from
Mexico23 (Cement), various U.S. petitioners complained that their Mex-
ican competitors could buy natural gas, petroleum feedstock, and heavy
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. 48 Fed. Reg. 28,522 (Dep't Comm. 1983) (final determination).
22. 48 Fed. Reg. 29,564 (Dep't Comm. 1983) (final determination).
23. 48 Fed. Reg. 43,063 (Dep't Comm. 1983) (final determination).
VOL. 21, NO. 4
U.S.-CANADA LUMBER AGREEMENT: PAST AS PROLOGUE 1189
fuel oil, respectively, at prices far below those available in the United
States. Because these inputs accounted for a high proportion of the end
product's value, the Mexican ammonia, carbon black, and cement pro-
ducers' costs of production were substantially lower than those across
the border in the U.S. 24
In each case, Commerce found no subsidy based solely upon the lower
prices in Mexico than in the U.S. for ammonia, petroleum feedstock, and
heavy fuel oil. Using the same type of analysis as in the Lumber cases,
Commerce determined that the issue was whether a good was provided
at a preferential rate. In the Ammonia case Commerce found that Petroleos
Mexicanos (PEMEX), the monopoly ammonia producer in Mexico, paid
more for natural gas than other industrial users in Mexico. 25 In the Carbon
Black case Commerce found that all Mexican industrial users could obtain
petroleum feedstock at the same price, so there was no preference within
the meaning of subsection 771(5)(B)(ii) of the Act. 26 In the Cement case
Commerce again found that all domestic users of heavy fuel oil in Mexico
could obtain it at the same price. Therefore, the fuel oil was not provided
"at a preferential rate." 27
HI. Judicial Decisions
The issues in these 1983 Commerce decisions spawned a series of suits
before the Court of International Trade28 involving the specificity and
preferentiality tests. 29 In a 1983 case the court upheld Commerce's ap-
24. This information was asserted in the petition in each case. See also 48 Fed. Reg. at
28,524, 29,566 and 43,066, respectively.
25. 48 Fed. Reg. at 28,524.
26. 48 Fed. Reg. at 29,564. However, Commerce made an affirmative determination in
that case, based in part on the carbon black producers' receipt of a 30% discount on their
natural gas costs and electrical power rates, granted under the Plan Nacional de Desarollo
Industrial to selected enterprises in certain regions. Id. at 29,566.
The facts of this case differed significantly from the other two Mexican natural resource
cases, however, because there were only two Mexican carbon black producers concerned,
and carbon black feedstock by definition was not used in Mexico by any other industry. In
the Ammonia and Cement cases, by contrast, there were numerous other industries that
used natural gas and heavy fuel oil. And in the Cement case, there were also numerous
producers of cement. (In the Ammonia case, PEMEX was the monopoly producer.)
27. Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, § 771(5)(B)(ii), 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(B)(ii) (1982 &
Supp. 11I 1985); 48 Fed. Reg. 43,063, 43,066 (Dep't Comm. 1983) (final determination). As
in the Carbon Black case, Commerce found other subsidies, including subsidized export
financing and domestic financing and tax benefits.
28. See Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, § 516A, 19 U.S.C. § 1516a (1982 & Supp. 111
1985).
29. In the Lumber cases petitioner appealed Commerce's negative preliminary determi-
nations (48 Fed. Reg. 10,395, as corrected at 48 Fed. Reg. 11,731), but did not challenge
the decision in toto. Instead, petitioner challenged only Commerce's preliminary determi-
nations that: (I) the Canadian federal and provincial governments' stumpage programs are
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plication of the specificity test. In Carlisle Tire & Rubber Co. v. United
States30 the court approved Commerce's interpretation of "bounty or
grant" in section 303 of the Act 3' as connoting some special or compar-
ative advantage conferred on an industry or industry group. 32 Judge Mal-
etz rejected the domestic industry's argument that "benefits from
government programs are countervailable even if they are generally avail-
able on a nonpreferential basis." 33 The court required that "at a minimum
either a regional or industry preference [must] be present in order for a
bounty or grant to exist." 34 In addition, the court concluded that the U.S.
petitioner's view would lead to countervailing duties on all generally avail-
able government benefits, such as public highways or universal tax credits,
a result the court considered absurd. 35 The court concluded that the
administrative burden of countervailing widely available benefits would
be overwhelming, not merely inconvenient. 36 And it felt administration
of the countervailing duty law would become arbitrary because the dollar
not directed to a specific industry or group of industries; and (2) an assumption of cost as
defined by 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(B)(iv) requires the relief by a foreign government of a pre-
existing statutory or contractual obligation of an enterprise or industry. The court ruled that
it lacked jurisdiction under § 516 of the Act to review Commerce's preliminary negative
determination, when: (1) petitioner did not challenge the determination itself, but two of
four discrete grounds for that determination; and (2) the determination would continue to
stand on the basis of the remaining, unchallenged grounds, even if the grounds in question
were struck down. U.S. Coalition for Fair Canadian Lumber Imports v. United States, 563
F. Supp. 838 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1983). Petitioner did not later appeal Commerce's negative
final determinations (48 Fed. Reg. 24,159).
30. 564 F. Supp. 834 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1983).
31. 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (1982 & Supp. 111 1985), which applied in all countervailing duty
investigations of products from Mexico prior to Mexico's conclusion in 1985 of an agreement
on subsidies "substantially equivalent" (within the meaning of Tariff Act of 1930, as amended,
§ 701(b)(2), 19 U.S.C. § 1671(b)(2) (1982 & Supp. I11 1985)) to obligations under the GATT
"Subsidies Code" (Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI and
XXIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Apr. 12, 1979, 31 U.S.T. 513, T.I.A.S.
No. 9619). See U.S.-Mexico Agreement Relating to Subsidies, Apr. 23, 1985.
32. 564 F. Supp. at 838.
33. Id. at 837. The benefits in this case were generally available tax deductions for ac-
celerated depreciation of equipment.
34. Id. at 838 (citing, inter alia, ASG Indus., Inc. v. United States, 610 F.2d 770 (C.C.P.A.
1979); ASG Indus., Inc. v. United States, 467 F. Supp. 1200 (Cust. Ct. 1979); Michelin Tire
Corp. v. United States, 2 Ct. Int'l Trade 143 (1981); Macalloy Corp. v. United States, I Ct.
Int'l Trade 199 (1981)).
35. 564 F. Supp. at 838. The court declared:
[A]doption of Carlisle's literal view that generally available benefits are a bounty or grant
would, if taken to its logical extreme, lead to an absurd result. Thus, included in Carlisle's
category of countervailable benefits would be such things as public highways and bridges,
as well as a tax credit for expenditures on capital investment even if available to all
industries and sectors .... To suggest, as Carlisle implicitly does here, that almost every
import entering the stream of American commerce be countervailed simply defies reason.
Id.
36. Id.
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value of widely available benefits to any given industry could not be
calculated accurately.3
7
In a 1984 case, however, the same court, in dictum, rejected the prop-
osition "that, as a rule, generally available benefits are not subsidies."
38
In Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. United States39 the court remarked, "[T]here
is no reason why a particular benefit cannot be extended without limi-
tation" and still be countervailable. 40 Yet the Bethlehem court claimed
to be in harmony with Carlisle.
4 1
In 1985 the court issued another decision following from Bethlehem
rather than Carlisle. In Agrexco (Agricultural Export Co.) v. United States42
the court reviewed inter alia a CVD decision by Commerce that benefits
conferred by government research and development "do not confer sub-
sidies when the research and development are provided for a wide range
of disciplines and projects." 4 3 In fact, Commerce had found that the
results were equally available worldwide, including to members of the
petitioner trade association. However, citing Bethlehem, the court ruled
that broad dissemination of the research and development results are
immaterial where the research and development "is targeted. to assist a
particular, rather than a general industry."44
In 1985, in Cabot Corp. v. United States,45 the court reviewed Com-
merce's 1983 Carbon Black decision and remanded the case to Commerce
to redetermine whether Mexico's provision of carbon black feedstock and
natural gas at government-set rates to the two Mexican carbon black
producers conferred a countervailable subsidy. First, the court held that
section 303 of the Act is unconcerned "with the nominal availability of a
governmental program." 46 Instead, "the question is what aid or advantage
has actually been received." 47
The court noted Commerce's finding that the rate in Mexico charged
for carbon black feedstock to carbon black producers was nonpreferential;
37. Id. The court stated: "Not only would accurate calculation of such benefits be difficult
in the extreme, doing so in a reasoned and evenhanded manner would be next to impossible."
Id.
38. Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. United States, 590 F. Supp. 1237, 1239 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1984).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 1242. The court further declared: "The idea that a subsidy can exist only by
means of a specific designation or singling out of a favored group from the productive sector
has no support in logic or law." Id.
41. Id. at 1246.
42. 604 F. Supp. 1238 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1985).
43. Id. at 1241.
44. Id. at 1241-42.
45. 620 F. Supp. 722 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1985).
46. Id. at 730.
47. Id.
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any individual user in Mexico could purchase it and natural gas at the
same price, which was well below world market prices. 48 However, the
court distinguished between generally available benefits accruing gener-
ally to all citizens, and those actually accruing only to specific individuals
or classes. The court stressed that even though some benefits may be
generally available, their actual bestowal may nonetheless constitute spe-
cific grants to specified, identifiable entities. The court held: "The ap-
propriate standard focuses on the de facto case by case effect of benefits
provided to recipients rather than on the nominal availability of benefits." 49
In dictum, the court continued to criticize Commerce's treatment of
the subsidy issue in the Carbon Black case as well. The court expressed
its view that the absence of a preference among purchasers of carbon
black feedstock within Mexico did not necessarily preclude Commerce
from finding that a subsidy had been conferred. Even if the prices charged
were nondiscriminatory among domestic purchasers, a bounty, grant, or
subsidy could still be found within the meaning of section 303 or section
771(5)(B). 50
IV. Commerce's Administrative Review of Carbon Black
While the U.S. Government was still appealing the Court of Interna-
tional Trade's Cabot ruling, 5' Commerce proceeded with the first admin-
istrative review of its Carbon Black order.52 In that review, Commerce
reaffirmed its earlier position with respect to natural gas priced in Mexico
48. Id. at 731. The court noted that discounts were provided to enterprises located within
specified regions. Id. Commerce had already found such regional benefits countervailable.
Carbon Black from Mexico, 48 Fed. Reg. 29,564, 29,566 (Dep't Comm. 1983) (final
determination).
49. 620 F. Supp. at 732.
50. Id. at 732-33. However, the court also rejected plaintiff's argument that any price
below the world market price is per se a countervailable benefit. The court noted that the
availability of inputs at lower prices could result from noncountervailable factors such as
comparative advantage, excess supply, or low production costs. Id. at 733 n.9.
The government appealed the Court of International Trade's Cabot decision to the Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which dismissed it. Cabot Corp. v. United States, 788
F.2d 1539 (Fed. Cir. 1986). The government challenged the lower court's rejection of Com-
merce's "generally available benefits" standard and substitution of a "competitive advan-
tage" standard for what constitutes a countervailable bounty or grant. Id. at 1541. Cabot
Corporation, the petitioner in the Commerce investigation, claimed that appeal was pre-
mature (in the absence of an interlocutory certification) because the lower court order
required further action by Commerce prior to final action by the court. Id. The appeals
court agreed, and concluded that the CIT order was not a final appealable order. Id. at 1544.
51. 620 F. Supp. 722 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1985).
52. Carbon Black from Mexico, 51 Fed. Reg. 13,269 (Dep't Comm. 1986) (prelim. admin.
review). This preliminary review was published on April 18, 1986, only nine days after the
Federal Circuit dismissed the government's appeal. The U.S. Government considered the
court's remand order for a "redetermination" effectively implemented through its prelim-
inary administrative review. The court agreed, and on this basis vacated its order.
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below "world market" prices. It noted that there are many actual users
of natural gas in a wide variety of industries.
5 3
Nevertheless, Commerce reconsidered its earlier decision that prices
within Mexico for carbon black feedstock below "world market" prices
do not confer a subsidy because the feedstock is generally available and
the prices are not preferential. Commerce stressed that in fact, there was
only one industrial use for carbon black feedstock (to make carbon black)
and only two users. In these circumstances, Commerce preliminarily de-
termined that it had "placed excessive emphasis" on the fact that the
only limitations on sales of an input were due to the inherent nature of
the input and the level of applicable technological advancement, rather
than to governmental action. 54 Instead, it determined that with respect
to carbon black feedstock, there are too few users to support a finding
that the feedstock is provided on a generally available basis.
55
For these reasons, Commerce felt compelled to use alternative methods
to determine whether that product was provided at a preferential rate.
Commerce included a "Preferentiality Appendix" to its preliminary re-
view, describing and ranking suitable alternative methods.56 Commerce's
"first choice" remains comparing the price charged to various recipients
within the country concerned. Where (as here) the recipients are too few,
however, Commerce's first "fallback" is to review prices charged by the
same seller for a similar or related good. Appropriately adjusted, such
prices can serve as a benchmark for measuring preferentiality with respect
to sales of the input under consideration. Based upon expert testimony,
Commerce determined that the prices charged by PEMEX for heavy fuel
oil No. 6-appropriately adjusted-serve as an effective benchmark for
measuring any preferentiality in PEMEX's prices for carbon black feed-
stock. On this basis, Commerce preliminarily found that such feedstock
is not provided to Mexican carbon black producers at a preferential rate.
57
While Commerce did not resort to any other method of determining
preferentiality in this case, the "preliminary" Preferentiality Appendix
lists three other possible approaches, in the following tentative order. If
Commerce finds the two above-described tests inappropriate in a given
case, its next recourse generally is to compare the price charged for the
good or service concerned with the prices charged within the relevant
jurisdiction by other sellers for an identical good or service. The next
53. Id. at 13,271.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 13,272-73.
57. Id. at 13,271.
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fallback for determining preferentiality is to compare the price charged
for the product or service concerned with the cost of providing the good
or service. Finally, the "least desirable" method for determining pref-
erentiality is to compare the price charged for the product or service
considered with prices paid for the same product or service outside the
relevant jurisdiction (e.g., in the U.S.), in a market that resembles as
closely as possible the market in question.58
V. Commerce's Lumber Preliminary Determinations
On May 19, 1986, the Coalition for Fair Lumber Imports filed a new
countervailing duty petition complaining that Canada subsidizes softwood
lumber products 59 and that imports of those products cause or threaten
material injury to a U.S. industry. 6° In June 1986 the International Trade
Commission again preliminarily found injury to a U.S. industry.61 This
time, however, Commerce preliminarily found subsidies of fifteen percent
ad valorem, including subsidies bestowed under the provincial stumpage
programs. Commerce determined that a subsidy within the meaning of
section 771(5)(B) was provided to a specific group of industries. Regarding
the specificity test, Commerce decided to reexamine Canadian provincial
stumpage programs despite its 1983 determinations, in light of new evi-
dence presented by the petitioner and the petitioner's contention that
there had been an evolution in the Department's interpretation of the
law.62
Regarding the specificity test, Commerce said it "continues to adhere
to the position that specificity is a prerequisite for a domestic subsidy.
" . .- 63 The Department noted that in its six years of administering the
CVD law, 64 it has found that the specificity test cannot be reduced to a
"precise mathematical formula." 65 Instead, the determination whether
"specificity" exists requires the exercise of judgment and a balance of
various factors, including: (1) the extent to which a foreign government
acts to limit a program's availability; (2) the number of enterprises, in-
dustries, or groups that actually use a program, and the extent to which
each uses a program; and (3) the extent to which the government exercises
discretion in making the program available.
58. Id. at 13,273,
59. The products complained of this time were softwood lumber, siding, and flooring.
60. Petition of the Coalition for Fair Lumber Imports (May 19, 1986) (Dep't Comm.).
61. Softwood Lumber from Canada, USITC Pub. 1874, Inv. No. 701-TA-274, (June 1986).
62. Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, 51 Fed. Reg. 37,453 (Dep't Comm.
1986) (prelim. determination).
63. Id. at 37,455.
64. See supra note 3.
65. 51 Fed. Reg. at 37,456.
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In the instant investigations, Commerce said that it had received in-
adequate responses to its questions about the specificity of the provincial
stumpage programs. On the basis of the best information available, there-
fore, it determined that the specificity requirements of section 771(5)(B)
of the Act were satisfied. 66 In making this determination, Commerce relied
upon the Canadian governments' exercise of "considerable discretion"
regarding the allocation of stumpage rights and significant evidence of the
disproportionate receipt of stumpage rights. 67 Commerce also noted that
the furniture manufacturing industry-cited in 1983 as one of at least three
groups of industries benefiting from stumpage rights-owned negligible
rights, if they owned any at all. It also noted that the lumber and pulp
and paper industries "tend to be horizontally integrated into single en-
terprises," 68 and share the same trade associations. Commerce noted that
these facts call into question its view in 1983 that the lumber industry and
the pulp and paper industry represent at least two different groups of
industries. 6 9 Finally, Commerce noted that its previous reliance on Stan-
dard Industrial Classification codes may have been misplaced in light of
the integration and concentration of production between the lumber and
pulp and paper industries. 70
Having determined (on the basis of best information available) that
Canadian provincial stumpage benefits were provided to a specific indus-
try or group of industries, Commerce next reviewed whether those ben-
efits were subsidies within the meaning of section 771(5)(B)(ii) of the Act.
In deciding whether the raw timber was provided at a preferential rate,
Commerce noted its preferred test for determining preferentiality, a com-
parison of the prices charged within the jurisdiction. However, Commerce
said that it lacked adequate information to determine whether there is
price discrimination by the provincial governments of British Columbia
and Alberta. 7 1
Commerce then rejected its first "fallback" method of determining
preferentiality, prices charged by the government for a similar or related
good. It said that the only good similar to softwood stumpage was hard-
wood stumpage, which is limited to the same group of users.
66. Id. at 37,456; see Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, § 776(b), 19 U.S.C. § 1677e (1982
& Supp. III 1985), which authorizes Commerce to use "the best information otherwise
available" if a party "refuses or is unable to produce information requested in a timely
manner and in the form required, or otherwise significantly impedes an investigation.




71. While there are some competitively bid sales in those provinces, Commerce was not
satisfied that the products were truly comparable. Moreover, it noted that government limits
on supply and demand may render the competitively bid prices meaningless in any event.
Id.
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Commerce next considered its second alternative test, prices charged
within the jurisdiction by other sellers for an identical good. It concluded
that this test was equally inappropriate in these cases, in the absence of
significant private price information.
Commerce preliminarily adopted its third alternative test for prefer-
entiality, a comparison of stumpage prices with the government's cost of
producing the good. Based upon the information in the record of these
investigations, Commerce preliminarily determined that Alberta, British
Columbia, Ontario, and Quebec do not recover the costs of providing
standing timber to stumpage holders, and that their expenditures directly
related to commercial timber harvesting exceed directly related revenues.
On this basis, they preliminarily made an affirmative determination with
respect to Canadian provincial stumpage programs.
Under the time limits established in the Act, 72 Commerce's final de-
termination was due December 30, 1986. If it had been affirmative, the
International Trade Commission's final injury determination would have
been due within forty-five days thereafter. 73
VI. The U.S.-Canada Lumber Agreement
On the same day that final subsidy determinations were due, however,
the United States and Canada concluded a memorandum of understanding
under which Canada agreed to collect a tax of fifteen percent ad valorem
on certain softwood products made on or after January 8, 1987, 74 and
exported to the U.S. 75
72. Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, § 735(a)(1), 19 U.S.C § 167ld(a)(1) (1982 & Supp. Ill
1985).
73. Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, § 735(b)(2), 19 U.S.C. § 1671d(b)(2) (1982 & Supp.
IIl 1985).
74. From Dec. 30, 1986, to Jan. 8, 1987, the U.S. collected a temporary import tax of
15% ad valorem on such imports from Canada under the authority of the Trade Act of 1974,
as amended, § 301, 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1982). Proclamation No. 5595, 52 Fed. Reg. 229 (1987).
This action was based upon the President's finding that Canada's inability to collect an
export charge of that amount during that time period was unjustifiable or unreasonable and
a burden or restriction on U.S. commerce. Determination under Section 301 of the Trade
Act of 1974, Memorandum of Dec. 30, 1986, for the Secretary of Commerce and the United
States Trade Representative, 52 Fed. Reg. 231 (1987). In a separate determination under
§ 301 on the same day, in view of the "critical importance" of the fulfillment of the objectives
and commitments in the U.S.-Canada lumber agreement, the President directed the Sec-
retary of Commerce to determine periodically whether Canadian federal and provincial
governments are fully imposing the export charge. Determination under Section 301 of the
Trade Act of 1974, Memorandum of Dec. 30, 1986, for the Secretary of Commerce, 52 Fed.
Reg. 233 (1987). The President declared that if the Secretary of Commerce determines that
such export charges are not being fully imposed, then the President "will take action ...
to offset any shortfall." Id.
75. However, in an appendix to the memorandum of understanding, the two governments
excluded from the agreement the same companies that Commerce had preliminarily excluded
VOL. 21, NO. 4
U.S.-CANADA LUMBER AGREEMENT: PAST AS PROLOGUE 1197
The agreement was expressly contingent on the withdrawal of the coun-
tervailing duty petition and Commerce's termination of the investigations,
which was done on December 30, 1986.76 The agreement provided that
it is "without prejudice" to the position of either Government as to whether
the stumpage programs and practices of Canadian governments constitute
subsidies under United States law or any international agreement." 77
Under the agreement, Canada may reduce or eliminate the export charge
to the extent the provinces increase stumpage or other charges. 78 How-
ever, Canada does not undertake to modify its stumpage charges or prac-
tices. Canada does agree to: "take no action, and ... [to] take all reasonable
steps to ensure that no other governmental body in Canada takes any
action, directly or indirectly, which has the effect of offsetting or reducing
the export charge or replacement measures, except as provided in this
Understanding." 79
VII. The Significance of the Lumber Agreement
The lumber agreement and the developments leading to it are significant
for several reasons. First, the evolution of the CVD law in general and
of the specificity and subsidy tests in particular reflect Commerce's and
the court's intellectual honesty and openmindedness in interpreting and
applying the CVD law. The Department has shown that it is willing to
reconsider issues if interested parties marshall appropriate information
and arguments warranting reconsideration.
Second, the litigation spawned by the 1983 Commerce decisions on
natural resources demonstrates the importance and effectiveness of the
substantially increased judicial review provisions enacted by the Congress
in 1979.80 Congress intended to provide more opportunities for judicial
review, in large part as a check on Executive Branch discretion in ad-
ministering the countervailing duty and antidumping laws. 81 Recently the
from its countervailing duty investigations based upon their receipt of no subsidies. Mem-
orandum of understanding para. 3(d).
76. Termination of an investigation is authorized by Tariff Act of 1930, as amended,
§ 704(a)(1), 19 U.S.C. § 1671c(a)(1) (1982 & Supp. 111 1985). Under the Act and the agreement
(para. 3(c)), Commerce's termination resulted in a release of all bonds and refund of all
deposits made pursuant to the preliminary determination. See Certain Softwood Lumber
Products from Canada, 52 Fed. Reg. 315 (Dep't Comm. 1987) (termination).
77. Para. 3(b) of the U.S.-Canada Memorandum of Understanding on Trade in Certain
Softwood Lumber Products.
78. Id., para. 5(a).
79. Id., para. 6.
80. Trade Agreements Act of 1979, § 1001-02, Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144, 300-07
(codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2112 & 2581 (1982)).
81. See generally I.M. DESTLER, AMERICAN TRADE POLITICS: SYSTEM UNDER STRESS
(1986); Koh, Congressional Controls of Presidential Trade Policymaking After I.N.S. v.
Chadha, 18 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1191, 1205-06 (1986).
FALL 1987
1198 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
courts have played a significant role in shaping the course of the CVD
law. At least theoretically, this should reduce the pressure that disap-
pointed U.S. petitioners attempt to apply to the Congress to amend the
law whenever Commerce makes any determination adverse to their
interests. 82
Third, the lumber agreement demonstrates that governments frequently
prefer a negotiated solution to a significant trade problem than unilateral
action by one government. Particularly with the discussions of a free trade
area agreement pending between the United States and Canadian gov-
ernments, a less confrontational handling of this long-lived problem prob-
ably better served the interests of both parties.
Finally, the lumber agreement reflects that truly "big" cases occasion-
ally are resolved prior to final Commerce or ITC determinations. In this
respect the agreement follows in the footsteps of the 1982 carbon steel
antidumping and countervailing duty cases against European Communi-
ties Member States,8 3 and the recent U.S.-Japan Arrangement Regarding
Trade in Semiconductor Products. 84
82 For example, numerous proposals to establish legislatively a "natural resource sub-
sidy" resulted from the 1983 Commerce decisions and criticism of them by some U.S.
industries and members of Congress. See, e.g., H.R. 4784, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG.
REC. H7904, H7952-53 (daily ed. July 26, 1984); H.R. 1950, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 502,
131 CONG. REC. H1900 (daily ed. April 3, 1985); H.R. 2345, 99th Cong., Ist Sess., 131
CONG. REC. H2841 (daily ed. May 2, 1985); and H.R. 2451, 99th Cong., Ist Sess., 131
CONG. REC. H3098 (daily ed. May 9, 1985).
83. These cases likewise culminated in a government-to-government agreement based
upon the withdrawal by petitioners of all their petitions. See Certain Steel Products from
Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands
and the United Kingdom, 47 Fed. Reg. 49,058 (Dep't Comm. 1982) (termination); and
Arrangements Concerning Steel Products, Oct. 21, 1982.
84. Signed Sept. 2, 1986, 25 I.L.M. 1408 (1986). This agreement involved a case under
§ 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended, 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1982) (see Memorandum for
the United States Trade Representative, Determination under Section 301 of the Trade Act
of 1974, 51 Fed. Reg. 27,811 (1986), 52 Fed. Reg. 13,412 (1987)), and two dumping cases
(Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory Semiconductors from Japan, 51 Fed. Reg.
28,253 (Dep't Comm. 1986) (suspension); and Dynamic Random Access Memory Semicon-
ductors of 256 Kilobits and Above from Japan, 51 Fed. Reg. 28,396 (Dep't Comm. 1986)
(suspension)).
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